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Protecting Against Employment
Discrimination: The Ninth Circuit's
Interpretation of Mandatory
Arbitration of Title VII Claims
Renteria v. PrudentialIns. Co. ofAmerica'

I. INTRODUCTION
The growing trend toward reliance upon arbitration, rather than judicial
adjudication, has resulted in a reformation regarding the resolution of disputes within
the employment industry. It has become a standard practice of many employers to
require that employees sign employment agreements before they are allowed to
work. Recently, these types of agreements have begun to require that employees
resolve any disputes or claims against their employers through arbitration rather than
judicial adjudication. Unfortunately, the average employee is often unaware of the
binding nature of these agreements until a dispute actually arises with his or her
employer. The Ninth Circuit has sought to protect employees from these types of
.agreements, and preserve Title VII judicial remedies, by refusing to enforce such
arbitration provisions when the employee does not have knowledge or notice of
them. This Note will examine the Ninth Circuit's unique interpretation of these
mandatory arbitration agreements and the possible advantages and disadvantages of
requiring employees to arbitrate their Title VII claims against employers.
Furthermore, it will explore Renteria's impact on that apparently continuing
interpretation.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This case arose between the appellant, Rachel Renteria, and her employer,
Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential").' On March 22, 1992, Ms. Renteria
was hired by Prudential.3 At that time, she signed a Uniform Application for
Securities Industry Registration ("Form U-4") which contained a clause requiring her
to arbitrate any claim, dispute or controversy listed in the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD") Code, as may be amendedfrom time to time, that she
might have against Prudential.4 Although the agreement contained this clause,

1. 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997).

2. Id.
at1105.
3. Id.
4. Id. At the time Renteria began her employment with Prudential, the Form U-4 bound her to
arbitrate, "any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or
any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the
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neither it nor the NASD Code explicitly required the arbitration of disputes arising
from an employee's termination.5 However, on October 1, 1993, the NASD Code
6
was amended, mandating arbitration for such employment termination disputes.
Ms. Renteria was fired six days later, and on October 7, 1994, she filed a complaint
against Prudential alleging various claims, including sexual harassment under Title
VII and Nevada state statutes."
Ms. Renteria's complaint was removed to the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada where Prudential's motion to compel arbitration on the sexual
harassment claim was denied, and Prudential appealed.' On appeal, Prudential
contended that Ms. Renteria should be held to the strict language requirements of the
application; therefore, the amendment provision obligated her to abide by any future
company policies. 9 In addition, Prudential argued that the court should, at the very
least, require an evidentiary hearing on the question of Ms. Renteria's subjective
°
knowledge of the arbitration clause.' Prudential asserted that ultimately she should
be bound to arbitrate her dispute." On appeal, Ms. Renteria argued that she should
2
not be forced to submit to such an agreement and arbitrate her claims.' The
appellate court, in denying Prudential's motion to compel arbitration, reasoned that
the amendment provision of the application did not allow Prudential to alter the
3
scope of the application without notice.' Furthermore, the court emphasized the
importance of the public policy requiring the protection of victims of sexual
discrimination and harassment."'
In rendering its decision on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit relied upon its earlier decision in PrudentialIns. Co. of America v.
Lai,15 which held that "a Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to forego her statutory
remedies and arbitrate her claims if she has knowingly agreed to submit such
disputes to arbitration."' 16 Applying-Lai's "knowing waiver" test to the case at hand,
the Ninth Circuit held that when a written employment agreement does not create
knowledge or express notice of the requirement of binding arbitration of Title VII
claims, there is no waiver of those remedies for sexual harassment claims."'

organizations indicated in Item 10 [NASD] as may be amended from time to time," and the NASD Code
provided that "any dispute, claim or controversy ... arising in connection with the business of such
memberfs] or in connection with the activities of such associated person[s], shall be arbitrated under this
Code."
5. Id.
6. Id. The amended provision included claims "arising out of the employment or termination of
employment of such associated person[s] by and with such member," as a category of claims requiring
adjudication through arbitration.
7. Id.
8. Id.
at 1106-1107.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1108.
12. Id. at 1106.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
16. Id. at 1305.
17. Renteria, 113 F.3d at 1108.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The instant decision comes in the wake of a multitude of decisions that
undermine, examine and support the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lai. Prior to
Lai,
courts had relied heavily on the decision of Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp.
in enforcing arbitration clauses of employment agreements to the preclusion
of
employees' statutorily based Title VII and discrimination claims. 8 The Ninth
Circuit, however, limited the Gilmer decision by recognizing the "knowing waiver"
requirement of Lai. 9 This "knowing waiver" requirement serves to protect
employees from arbitration clauses, by allowing for a waiver of statutory remedies
only when the employee has knowledge of such a waiver.20 Under Lai's "knowing
waiver" requirement, mandatory arbitration provisions in employment agreements
would potentially be invalidated and unenforceable in the Ninth Circuit."'
To
provide a better analysis of the Ninth Circuit's instant decision it is important
to first
examine the brief history of employment agreements containing arbitration clauses
and the recent judicial interpretations of the "knowing waiver" requirement.
In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,22 the United States Supreme Court dealt
with the issue of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements and
held
that employees could not prospectively waive their right to a judicial forum
under
a Title VII claim in an employment agreement. 3 The Court reasoned that
the
importance of eliminating the harms anticipated by Title VII outweighed
the
importance of arbitration and the valuable judicial economy it facilitates.24
The
Court also stressed the congressional intent behind Title VII and the essential
role
of the Title VII private cause of action in combatting discriminatory employment
practices. In addition, the Court questioned the practical and procedural suitability
of arbitration in resolving Title VII disputes.26 Other jurisdictions have relied
upon
the Court's reasoning in Alexander in holding that individuals cannot waive
their
Title VII protected rights in an employment agreement.27
The Alexander interpretation of mandatory arbitration agreements was
undermined by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer.5 In Gilmer,
the Court held that employees can be required to arbitrate statutory discrimination
claims pursuant to employment agreements that contain mandatory arbitration
provisions.2 9 The agreement at issue in Gilmer was the same U-4 Securities

18. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
19. 42 F.3d at 1305.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
23. Id. at 51.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 56-57.
27. See, e.g., Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th
Cir. 1988); Utley v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 8?3 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989); Schwartz v. Florida Bd.
of Regents, 807 F.2d 901
(I Ith Cir. 1987).
28. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20(1991).
29. Id.
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3°
Registration Application that was involved in Lai and the instant decision. In
a
Gilmer, the Court examined the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") " and recognized
that, in order to attain the full benefits of the arbitration process, there is a
2
presumption in favor of arbitrability under the FAA. In making that determination,
the Court ultimately reasoned that individuals could obtain the same statutory
remedy through the forum of arbitration as they could through the judicial forum,
thereby stressing the validity of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
agreements.33 After Gilmer, a large number of appellate court decisions have
explored its holding, many in the specific context of Title VII claims where an
34
employer attempted to bind an employee to arbitration.
While recognizing the validity of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
agreements, the Ninth Circuit tried to limit the practical implication of such clauses
35
by creating the "knowing waiver" requirement in Lai. The court based its decision
on many of the policy concerns detailed in Alexander, and held that the importance
of protecting victims of employment discrimination created a stronger interest than
that requiring arbitration.36 Therefore, they held that employees could not
unknowingly waive their Title VII right to adjudication through a judicial, rather
than arbitral, forum.37 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit detailed reasons why a judicial
forum provides a more adequate procedural and practical remedy for Title VII
claimants. They suggested that the limited discovery process of a judicial forum is
necessary to protect potential victims of sexual harassment from unwarranted
3
investigation into, and publicity regarding, their sexual history. " The Lai decision
directly contradicted the Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer that both judicial and
arbitral forums provide an identical substantive remedy.
Since Lai, various jurisdictions have provided differing interpretations of
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements, with the majority of courts
40
declining to follow Lai.3 9 In Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assur. Co., the Eastern
District of Michigan declined to adopt the reasoning provided by Lai and enforced
4
an arbitration clause similar to the one rendered void by Lai. ' The Beauchamp court
held that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lai "flies in the face of the language of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, and the
42
fundamental principles of contract law.", Accepting the Gilmer holding, the court
then turned to a contractual examination of the employment agreement and found

30. Id at 23.
31. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1- 15 (1988).
32. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
33. Id. at 30-32.
34. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Bender
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11 th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948
F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
35. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1304.
36. Id. at 1305.
at 1305 n.4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1474 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997).
40. 918 F. Supp 1091 (1996).
41. Id. at 1096.
42. Id.
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the mandatory arbitration clause to be enforceable because it was "substantially
reasonable and not oppressive or unconscionable."43
The Southern District of New York posited that "the reasoning of Lai has been
criticized by courts in this and other Circuits as contrary to Supreme Court precedent
and as based on citation of inadequate legislative history."" These courts argue that
the policy considerations detailed in Lai and Alexander should not compel a court
45
to "turn contract law on its head."
Yet the Ninth Circuit has held strong. In Nelson v. Cyrus Bagdad Copper
Corporation," the Ninth Circuit extended its holding in Lai to cover mandatory
arbitration clauses requiring for the arbitration of statutory claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 47 as well as under Title VII. 4s However,

the Ninth Circuit, in enforcing a mandatory arbitration clause, has held that a party
attempting to avoid arbitration has the burden of showing that the Act underlying the
statutory claim includes a "knowing waiver" requirement.49 In Kuehner, the Court
held that the plaintiff had failed to meet that burden and therefore enforced a clause
requiring arbitration of claims arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act
50
("FLSA").

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Renteria relies upon its own reasoning in Lai,
decided under similar factual circumstances. As in Lai, the plaintiff in Renteria filed
a sexual discrimination suit under Title VII, signed a Form U-4 containing an
arbitration clause, and requested relief against the same defendant in Prudential. 5'
In both cases, the primary issue was whether the arbitration clause signed by the
plaintiffs included Title VII claims.52 The Renteria decision echoed the policy
reasons underlying the Lai decision. 3 The court examined the policy concerns
regarding protecting victims of employment discrimination balancing them against
the FAA presumption in favor of arbitration, and it looked at the procedural and
practical advantages of a judicial forum over an arbitral forum.54 Because of these
43. Id. at 1098-99.
44. Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
45. Brookwood v. Bank of Am. National Trust and Savings Association, 53 Cal.Rptr. 2d 515, 519
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
46. 119 F.3d 756 (1997).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
48. Nelson at 761. The court held that, "just as a knowing agreement to arbitrate disputes covered
by the act is required by Title VII, so too a knowing agreement is required under the ADA."
49. Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1996). When recognizing this holding
in its Renieria decision, the Ninth Circuit explained Kuehner's holding in a broad fashion, citing it for
the express proposition that "the 'knowing waiver' requirement did not apply to [any] claims under the
FLSA."

50. Id.

51. Renteria, 113 F.3d at 1105.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1106.
54. Id. at 1107.
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considerations, the court held that mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
agreements are only enforceable when the employee has knowledge and/or notice
5
of the binding requirement of the agreement.
At the time Ms. Renteria signed her employment agreement, the arbitration
provision in the NASD Code was essentially the same as when the Lai plaintiffs
signed their agreement.5 ' The only difference between Lai and Renteria is that the
arbitration clause in Renteria included all disputes listed in the NASD Code as may
5
be amendedfrom time to time (emphasis added). In Renteria, the court held that
"the 'as amended' language does not take the case out of the [knowing waiver] rule,"
arguing that the language only made explicit what was implicitly considered in the
Lai provision. 8 Extending Lai, the court added that the precise wording was not at
issue in nullifying the arbitration provision because the agreements failed to describe
9
the types of disputes subject to mandatory arbitration.

V. COMMENT
In the face of criticism from nearly every jurisdiction that has examined this
issue, the Ninth Circuit was given a second chance to "correctly" decide the issue of
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements. Surprisingly, however,
when presented with this opportunity for redemption in Renteria, the Ninth Circuit
60
The facts in Renteria are
actually extended their own holding in Lai.
agreement in Renteria
employment
the
that
in
Lai,
in
those
from
distinguishable
contained an amendment provision binding the employee to any future NASD
policies. 6' However, the Renteria court rallied behind the same reasoning it provided
in Lai and applied the "knowing waiver" requirement. It held that, regardless of the
language of the agreement, Ms. Renteria did not have explicit knowledge or notice
62
of the arbitration requirement and therefore that it was unenforceable. The ultimate
question regarding Renteria is whether it is the second decision in a new line of
reasoning regarding arbitration clauses, or merely a dying ripple from the splash of
a failed Ninth Circuit experiment.
In evaluating the Ninth Circuit's stubborn reliance on its own "knowing
waiver" requirement, it is important to examine the delicate balance of public policy
considerations underlying that requirement. The Lai and Renteria decisions
emphasize the importance of the public policy requiring protection of victims of
employment discrimination, at the expense of the need to encourage arbitration
under the FAA.63 The Renteria court specifically recognized the legislative history
of Title VII and concluded that "the public policy of protecting victims of sexual

55. Id. at 1108.
56. Id. at1106.
57. Id.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.at1104.
Id.at1106-1107.
Id.at1108.
Id.at1106 (citing Lai).
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discrimination and harassment.., is at least as strong as our public policy in favor
of arbitration."' Other jurisdictions have not been so quick to adopt a similar
conclusion in order to justify preserving a judicial forum for Title VII plaintiffs.

5

These courts generally stress the importance of traditional notions of contract law
and the congressional intent behind the FAA in support of their enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements.
The public policy considerations cited in Lai and Renteria in support of the
"knowing waiver" requirement include: the promotion of Title VII claims, the
protection of victims of sexual discrimination and harassment, the right to a jury trial
of one's peers, and the discovery process. The arbitral forum, contrary to Gilmer,
is inadequate to protect victims of Title VII discrimination and harassment when
compared to the judicial forum. 66 In a judicial forum, a Title VII plaintiff would be
entitled to a jury trial and protected from unwarranted investigations into his or her
sexual history.67 In addition, the public nature of a judicial forum better facilitates
the prevention of future sexual discrimination and harassment.68 One theory behind
this principle is that employers will become more aware of the possible
consequences of their behavior, and discriminatory conduct will likely be reduced.6 9
While the Ninth Circuit extended its holding in Lai, it appears that the
"knowing waiver" requirement is limited to a factually narrow spectrum of cases.
The special policy considerations and circumstances surrounding a Title VII sexual
discrimination claim necessitate a judicial forum, while other claims may be
adequately resolved through an arbitral forum. In Cione v. ForestersEquity Services
Inc.,70 a California Appellate Court did not apply the Renteria decision in enforcing
a Form U-4 arbitration clause under the unamended NASD Code. 7' The Cione court
pointed to Kuehner and Renteria, in reasoning that the "knowing waiver"
requirement only applies to Title VII sexual discrimination claims, and not age
discrimination claims. 72 That court also noted that "even as to Title VII cases, the
'knowing waiver' portion of Lai restated in Renteriahas been severely criticized by
other federal courts and by another California appellate court. 73
As the law in the Ninth Circuit, Renteria currently serves to protect the judicial
forum for Title VII plaintiffs. In the future, however, it is difficult to determine what
impact this decision might have on mandatory employment agreements. At the very
least, it will protect employees from "hidden" arbitration clauses in employment

64. Id.
65. See Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1474 (N.D. I11.
1997); Topf v. Wamaco, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 762, 771 (D. Conn. 1996); Johnson v. Hubbard

Broadcasting, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 (D. Minn. 1996); Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales
Practices Litigation, 924 F. Supp. 627, 642 (D. N.J. 1996).
66. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
67. Id. at n.4.
68. Heidi M. Hellekson, Taking the "Alternative- Out of the DisputeResolution of Title VII Claims:
The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration Agreements Arising Out of
Employment Contracts, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 435,449-51 (1994).
69. Donna Meredith Matthews, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulory Arbitration ofStatutory
Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 352 (1997).
70. 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167 (Ca. Ct. App. 1997).
71. Id.at 179.
72. Id.
73. Id. Referring to Brookwood, supra note 45.
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agreements. It is unlikely, however, that it will have a practical impact on Title VII
claims, as employers will likely bypass the "knowing waiver" test by explicitly
drafting the mandatory arbitration clause into the employment agreement itself.
While this will avoid the problems highlighted in Renteria and Lai by putting the
employees on notice that they will be bound by arbitration, it will not effectively
protect against the dangerous ramifications that these decisions argue will result from
the arbitration of Title VII claims. Once employees have notice of the arbitration
clauses when they sign the required employment agreements, Lai and Renteria will
no longer provide a basis for rendering the agreements unenforceable. In that
scenario, employees would be forced to arbitrate Title VII claims that would be most
appropriately resolved in a judicial forum.
Commentators have suggested amending Title VII to specifically include
language preserving a judicial forum for plaintiffs by codifying the legislative
history detailing the importance of the public policy protecting against sexual
discrimination and harassment.7 4 This would, ideally, send a message to courts to
consider that public policy when attempting to interpret these agreements, without
requiring the enactment of explicit anti-arbitration language in Title VII. Another
solution might be for the legislature to amend the FAA, allowing for a more liberal
balancing test regarding the application of the strong public policy interest in favor
of arbitration. In such a system, the right to a judicial forum for special statutory
remedies like Title VII sexual discrimination claims, would depend upon a
determination of the appropriateness of an arbitral forum in relation to the desired
remedy. A court could then apply the Alexander, Lai or Renteria public policy
considerations in determining whether or not to enforce an arbitration clause. It
appears that, regardless of what possible alternatives might exist, the Renteria
decision will provide a limited impact on arbitration clauses in future employment
agreements. Once employers get past the "knowing waiver" requirement, the only
purpose the decision will serve is to demonstrate the policy considerations and
legislative intent in favor of the judicial adjudication of this type of claim. One
commentator has suggested that the reasoning used in Lai could logically be used to
assert a claim that an employee cannot waive a judicial statutory remedy unless he
or she is aware of the waiver and the waiver is voluntary.75 This "voluntary
requirement" would help to support an employee's right to maintain a judicial cause
of action under Title VII by protecting employees that have no choice but to sign
their employers required employment forms.76 However, unless this line of
reasoning in Lai and Renteria evolves into a requirement that employees cannot
involuntarily waive their statutory remedies under Title VII, it likely will not have
a great deal of impact upon future mandatory arbitration agreements.

74. Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The Need for
Amendment, 26 CONN. L. REv. 521 (1994).
75. Catherine Chatman, MandatoryArbitration of Title VII Claims: A New Approach, 1996 J. DISP.
RESOL.255,266.
76. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It appears from the many jurisdictions around the country that have failed to
follow Lai, that Renteria is quite possibly nothing more than the Ninth Circuit's
insistent reliance upon its own unique interpretation of arbitration clauses in
employment agreements. While the public policy considerations detailed in these
decisions are tremendously important to justify protecting an employee's right to an
appropriate forum under Title VII, the Ninth Circuit's "knowing waiver"
requirement is not an adequate solution. Employers will likely draft their
agreements so that they satisfy the "knowing waiver" requirement, and Title VII
plaintiffs that would more properly be in a judicial forum will be forced to arbitrate
their claims. Unless the legislature amends the FAA or Title VII to ensure a judicial
remedy in sexual discrimination cases, the Renteria decision will be unable to play
its intended role of protecting employees from mandatory arbitration clauses.
TODD C. STANTON
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